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I n his 1937 paper Coase addresses two problems. The first deals with thenature of the firm and is solved by assuming the existence of transactioncosts. Without such costs the market is always the best coordination devi-
ce. The second is : « why is not all production carried on in one big firm? »,
(Coase, 1937, p. 340)? This version of the selective intervention puzzle
(Williamson, 1995, p. 231) is solved by Coase by comparing, as rightly writ-
ten by Crémer, the internal and external marginal transaction costs. When they
are equal, the firm stops growing. The way Williamson explains the puzzle is
slightly different. He stresses that « the integrity of rule governance is unavoi-
dably compromised by discretion (Williamson, 1985, chapter 6). Accordingly
any effort to combine rule governance (as in markets) with discretionary
governance (hierarchy) experiences trade-offs » (Williamson, 1995, p. 231).
I agree with Crémer (2010) on the fact that it would have been more satisfacto-
ry to explain the internal (bureaucratic) and external (market) transaction costs on
the same basis. Such an explanation is however absent from the theories of the
firm. Wording the problem differently, Holmstrom stresses that « I take the owner-
ship of assets by firms, and the attendant feature that economics contracts are
made with firms, not with their employees or owners, as one of the most signifi-
cant and robust empirical regularities to be explained by any theory of the firm »,
(1999, p. 75) and adds « having said this let me confess at the start that I am unable
myself to offer a well-developed explanation of asset ownership by firms » (ibid.).
The problem of the boundaries of the firm is indeed still open. The intro-
duction of asymmetries of information does not solve this problem even if we
usually consider that adverse selection is a case of pre-contractual opportu-
nism and moral hazard a case of post-contractual one. As for the Grossman,
Hart and Moore’s theory, if it explains why somebody owns an asset, it does
not explain why a firm does own assets and how many.
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My first point is that, even if Crémer’s critic is completely relevant, it seems
to me that he argues as if Williamson was sharing the traditional incentive theo-
ry assumptions. It is however not the case. And this has very important conse-
quences not only in terms of the explanation of integration or nonintegration but
also in the very definition of the notion of contract. According to Grossman,
Hart and Moore (henceforth GHM), the notion of contract is a basic concept and
is a tie, i.e. a set of irrevocable commitments. Because individuals are rational
and some commitments not contractible (they are linked with observable but
non verifiable variables), contracting agents have no interest to respect them and
nobody can constraint them to do so. The allocation of property rights deter-
mines the bargaining positions of the parties ex post (that is the way they share
the surplus), and indirectly determines the decision to respect those commit-
ments. The point is then to define the optimal allocation of property rights. In
the GHM world, the relevant, i.e. the chosen type of contract (integration or not)
depends on the allocation of property rights because ‘the only way in which the
agents can be given incentives is through the allocation of property rights’
(Crémer, p. 7). Let’s compare this way of thinking with Williamson’s one (and
as we will see with the tenants of the transaction costs economics, henceforth,
TCE). Suppose few not perfectly rational and opportunistic individuals, tran-
sacting frequently in an uncertain world and both using highly specific assets.
The possibility for some of them to hold-up the others if they sign a long term
contract makes integration the only viable possibility. It follows that the charac-
teristics of a transaction, that is its frequency, the level of uncertainty and the
specificity of the assets that support it, are the determinant of the kind of
contract (integration, hybrid forms or market) that is selected (what the TCE
calls the governance structure). In fact the type of contract ‘‘chosen’’ depends
on the characteristics of the transaction. If the assets are not specific at all the
possibility for opportunistic individuals to hold-up the rent is ineffective and it
is therefore not necessary to integrate the associated transaction. To sum up the
TCE proposes a solution to the make or buy problem, which is a binary answer
but provides no explanation of the limits of the firm (2).
Accordingly, one of the main differences between the ways Grossman and
Hart (1986) or Hart and Moore (1990) and Williamson (1985, 1995) solve the
selective intervention puzzle is due to the different links they stress between
incentives, property rights and residual rights of control. According to GHM,
residual rights of control are given by property rights that enhance incentives
because decision rights are not separable from property rights (3), even if deci-
sion rights can be delegated. As for Williamson, what determines the choice
between make or buy is linked with the possibility for one party, depending on
the characteristics of the transaction to act opportunistically and consequently
hold-up the other party. The relation between property rights and incentives is
(2) The limits of the firm should indeed be defined by the factors that explain the existence of
(external) transaction costs.
(3) It follows logically as in Hart and Moore (2005) that an optimal command chain is charac-
terized by the fact that the probability of an individual having an idea on the use of a set of
assets is negatively related with his/her right to decide how to use this asset.
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not direct and the reason why integration takes place is not due to a problem
of incentives. This is due basically to the fact that in the TCE property rights
and decision rights are not linked as in the GHM approach. On this topic,
Riordan’s critic of the GHM approach which Crémer refers to is perfectly
clear. According to Riordan, it is not a problem of allocation of property rights
that explains vertical integration but a problem of decision rights. This is in
line with Coase when he writes that « the contract (4) is one whereby the fac-
tor, for a certain remuneration (that can be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey
the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. The essence of the
contract is that it should only state the limits of the powers of the entrepre-
neur » (1937, p. 391). The distinction Gibbons (2005) makes in Williamson’s
theory between rent-seeking and adaption approach highlights the way the
selective intervention puzzle is solved. According to the rent-seeking perspec-
tive « integration can stop socially haggling over, appropriable quasi-rents ? »
(Gibbons, 2005, p. 204) whereas for the adaptation conception, the problem is
to ask « whether integration or non-integration better facilitates, adaptive,
sequential decision-making? » (ibid., p. 208). According to Gibbons, the pro-
blem is that Williamson, in order to solve the selective intervention puzzle
introduces the idea of costs of bureaucracy to balance the (external) costs of
transaction and consequently does not explain the size of the firm with the fac-
tors (asset specificity, frequency of transaction, uncertainty, bounded rationa-
lity, and opportunism) that are at the origin of transaction costs.
To sum up this first point, Crémer’s critic of Williamson’s selective inter-
vention puzzle solution is perfectly relevant and points a problem of consis-
tency : why internal transaction costs are not explained in the same ways that
external ones are? This critic does not however take into account that
Williamson’s conception is based on a very specific conception of a contract.
The second point that I want to stress is the fact that the relationships bet-
ween decision rights, property rights and incentives are perfectly disentangled
by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2004, 2008). They begin by opposing two tra-
ditions : the first which assimilates decision rights and property rights (the
GHM approach), the second, the traditional contractualist approach which
considers that decision rights are not directly given by property rights (5). This
distinction is thereafter used to try to unify those two approaches. They « defi-
ne a ‘‘governance structure’’ as an allocation of decision rights and payoffs to
the parties, regardless of whether this allocation is achieved through contracts
or asset ownership », (Baker, Gibbons, Murphy, 2008, p. 148). This definition
allows them to present a richer number of organizational devices (6) and to
(4) Here Coase considers a labor contract.
(5) « In the contractual literature, in contrast, we have seen decision rights moved across fixed
firm boundaries (i.e., without changing asset ownership). These decision rights can be extra-
cted (or « alienated ») from their native assets », (Baker, Gibbons, Murhy, 2004, p. 4).
(6) « We allow for a variety of observed governance structures for coordinating activities bet-
ween firms, including acquisitions, unstructured collaborations, divestitures, licensing
agreements, and royalty contracts », (Baker, Gibbons, Murphy, 2008, p. 148).
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analyze the relationships between firms that they define as « conscious
islands ». Accordingly even if they follow GHM when they define what inte-
gration and non integration are (2002), they improve this approach because
they stress the idea that just because some commitments are not contractible,
the downstream party has to « provide incentives to the upstream party only if
it is self-enforcing » for the relational contract (7) to persist (Baker, Gibbons,
Murphy, p. 41). If not, the upstream party has a high temptation to renege. In
other words the short term payoffs have to be lower than the long term ones.
A corollary of their model is that the firm cannot mimic the market just becau-
se the parties’ temptations to renege are then too high. In a dynamic perspec-
tive a tit for tat game permits to explain that as long as the parties’ temptations
to renege (the one shot payoffs) are lower than the interest to pursue the rela-
tional contract (the cumulated payoffs) the parties have both interest to conti-
nue to agree on this contract (8).
This theory seems an elegant solution both to the selective intervention puzz-
le à laWilliamson and to its Holmstrom’s expression (see above).
Crémer points a real problem and shows that the contractualist theories of
the firm have a challenge to take up. Fortunately some recent improvements of
the GHM approach, as the relational contract theory, quoted above accept it.
(7) A relational contract is a non written, unformal agreement.
(8) This result is sensitive to the discount rate (as in Axelrod, 1984).
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